Corporate Boards, Audit Committees and Voluntary Disclosure: A Case Analysis on Bangladeshi Listed Companies

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  •   Fakrul Ahmed

Abstract

The study tries to find the interaction of corporate disclosure and governance within the organization, focused stakeholders, and shareholders representation with internal information in the board. The paper investigates seven governance variables as the willful release of information proxy concentrated on organizational structure and functioning. Multiple regression has been performed to identify the explanatory power of the variables. The results are very much similar and consistent with the understanding that both internal and external control exist simultaneously to affect the shareholders' control to restrict each other. The results suggest that the size of the board does not affect the external control of voluntary disclosure. This paper can help to exhibit the relationship between proper and transparent corporate governance and required disclosure to reduce agency conflicts. This paper focused on the existing companies listed in the stock exchanges to identify and develop model to improve the agency setting. The paper should be interesting for the regulators, stakeholders, and practitioners to construct consistent policies with calls for more disclosure requirements in this agency setting.


Keywords: Corporate Governance, Liquidity, Leverage, Bangladesh

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How to Cite
Ahmed, F. (2021). Corporate Boards, Audit Committees and Voluntary Disclosure: A Case Analysis on Bangladeshi Listed Companies. European Journal of Business and Management Research, 6(2), 153–155. https://doi.org/10.24018/ejbmr.2021.6.2.821